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Does a border agent violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution when 
he questions an individual about that person’s religious beliefs? The answer is 
unclear. The analysis that should be undertaken to reach that answer is similarly 
unsettled. This Comment addresses that gap in the literature. It considers whether 
policies under which government officials question individuals about their religion 
and religious practices violate the Establishment Clause. Because the Clause is more 
commonly used to consider government endorsement of religion (such as policies 
concerning school prayer and displays on government property), this is an underex-
plored area of the law. This Comment therefore addresses why this type of religious 
questioning is an appropriate topic for Establishment Clause analysis, proposes a 
new test for Establishment Clause compliance, and provides examples of how the 
test would apply to various factual scenarios.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you go to Toronto for a weekend trip with your family. 
While driving home to Detroit, a border agent pulls you aside, 
brings you into an isolated room, and asks you, seemingly out of 
nowhere, “How many times a day do you pray?” 
Now imagine you are an Arab Muslim man named Ali Suleiman 
Ali.1 When you are asked this question, do you feel the same way 
you do when the government requests that you report your reli-
gious affiliation on a census form? Or do you feel insulted, believ-
ing that this agent, operating in the shadow of September 11 and 
statements by President Donald Trump like “Islam hates us” and 
“we’re having problems with the Muslims,”2 has equated the reli-
gious practices he assumes you hold with some sort of threat? 
The implications of this type of religious questioning by 
government officials have been considered in two recent district-
court cases: Cherri v Mueller3 (brought by Ali and other Muslim 
Americans stopped at the Canadian border)4 and Isakhanova v 
Muniz5 (brought by a Muslim American who was questioned by 
prison guards while visiting her inmate son).6 After facing a line of 
questions in this vein, the plaintiffs in each case argued that ques-
tions from government officials about plaintiffs’ religious practices 
violated the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution.7 Prior 
legal cases provided little guidance about whether the plaintiffs 
had a cognizable Establishment Clause claim. Although the 
Establishment Clause prohibits both government endorsement 
 
 1 See Cherri v Mueller, 951 F Supp 2d 918, 924–26 (ED Mich 2013) (detailing similar 
questioning faced by Ali and his coplaintiffs). 
 2 See International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 857 F3d 554, 594–95 (4th 
Cir 2017), vacd and remd, 2017 WL 4518553 (US) (listing times when Trump “expressed 
anti-Muslim sentiment”); Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees 
(CNN, Jan 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BM7H-MNLP. 
 3 951 F Supp 2d 918 (ED Mich 2013) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ 
motion to dismiss). 
 4 Id at 923–27. 
 5 2016 WL 1640649 (ND Cal) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
 6 Id at *5–6. 
 7 US Const Amend I, cl 1. See also Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 935; Isakhanova, 2016 
WL 1640649 at *5–6.  
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and disapproval of religion,8 Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has historically focused on cases of endorsement. It has matured 
through cases centered on nativity scenes, statues of the Ten 
Commandments, and school prayer. And even this canonical 
Establishment Clause case law is infamously muddled. Neither 
the Cherri nor the Isakhanova court grappled with the complicated 
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. They did not reason 
through which test they ought to apply to religious-questioning 
policies or take the chance to provide guidance to other courts on 
how to analyze such a policy. Instead, they both provided cursory 
holdings on their respective plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause 
claims. 
Courts should not treat religious-questioning policies so me-
chanically. These policies raise novel questions about the proper 
scope and application of the Establishment Clause that have 
recently gained urgency. Reports that border agents questioned 
travelers about their religious practices during the implementa-
tion of Trump’s “travel ban” in January 2017 trigger the same 
concerns as the practices considered in Cherri and Isakhanova.9 
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Dick Durbin both raised similar 
red flags when they questioned then–judicial nominee Amy Coney 
Barrett about her Catholic beliefs during her September 2017 
confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.10 
This Comment therefore uses the Cherri and Isakhanova decisions 
to start a broader discussion about the validity of religious ques-
tioning by government officials. Part I describes the tests used by 
the Supreme Court when analyzing Establishment Clause cases. 
It then explores a recent line of cases that provides guidance on 
how courts should analyze government policies that disapprove 
of, rather than endorse, religious beliefs. Part II introduces the 
 
 8 See Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 15–16 (1947). 
 9 See Amanda Holpuch and Ashifa Kassam, Canadian Muslim Grilled about Her 
Faith and View on Trump at US Border Stop (The Guardian, Feb 10, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TFR3-35YU (reporting that questions included “Which mosque do you go 
to? What is the name of the imam? How often do you go to the mosque? What kind of 
discussions do you hear in the mosque? Does the imam talk to you directly?”). See also 
International Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F3d at 572 (affirming a preliminary injunc-
tion against the executive order “that in text speaks with vague words of national security, 
but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”). 
 10 Durbin asked Barrett, “Do you consider yourself an ‘orthodox Catholic’?” while 
Feinstein noted, “[T]he dogma lives loudly within you. And that’s of concern.” Alexandra 
Desanctis, Did Durbin and Feinstein Impose a Religious Test for Office? (National Review, 
Sept 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LQL3-W7RY. 
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legal question: whether religious questioning by government offi-
cials violates the Establishment Clause. Part III determines that 
this legal question is properly analyzed under a novel “Lemon-
Larson” test. This approach combines two of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause tests to create a modified analysis that is 
tailored to consider the countervailing government interests in 
religious-questioning cases.11 Part III applies the Lemon-Larson 
framework to religious-questioning scenarios. It concludes that 
the questioning policies in both Cherri and Isakhanova would be 
unconstitutional under the Lemon-Larson test, as would most 
religious questioning. However, the Lemon-Larson test accommo-
dates the government interests that truly require entanglement 
with religion in a way that current Establishment Clause juris-
prudence does not, adapting the Establishment Clause to a new 
manifestation of disapproval-of-religion cases. 
I.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, AS INTERPRETED BY 
THE COURTS 
In contrast to the large volume of academic literature that 
considers when the Establishment Clause has been violated, the 
clause itself is to the point. The Establishment Clause reads, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.”12 Part I.A examines how the Supreme Court has inter-
preted those ten words, focusing on the two tests most relevant to 
the religious-questioning cases: the Lemon test and the Larson 
test. Part I.B then presents a recent line of cases that demonstrate 
that courts analyze disapproval-of-religion cases under the same 
Establishment Clause tests as in the more common endorsement 
cases. Part I.C concludes by examining how other constitutional 
and statutory claims that could apply to religious-questioning 
cases interact with the Establishment Clause. 
 
 11 See Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612–13 (1971); Larson v Valente, 456 US 228, 
246 (1982). 
 12 US Const Amend I, cl 1. Despite the word “Congress,” the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment as applying to all federal government officials, as well 
as all state officials, through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421, 
429–30 (1962). 
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A. The Background of the Establishment Clause and Its Tests 
The foundational statement of what the Establishment 
Clause prohibits comes from Everson v Board of Education of 
Ewing Township,13 a 1947 Supreme Court decision: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion . . . or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influ-
ence a person to go to or to remain away from church against 
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.14 
This passage added meat to the bare bones of the Establishment 
Clause’s text. It also left open many unanswered questions. 
Everson did not, for example, say anything about whether other 
kinds of state actions could violate the Establishment Clause. Nor 
did it specify the test that courts should use to identify when the 
Establishment Clause had been violated. 
The threshold question of what additional acts violate the 
Establishment Clause, as well as the contours of the Everson 
prohibitions, have been the subject of voluminous case law in the 
decades since Everson. This case law can readily answer some 
questions about Establishment Clause cases. For example, a gov-
ernment policy is judged primarily on its objective effect rather 
than the subjective intent behind it.15 The Supreme Court has 
also explicitly stated that a government policy can violate the 
Establishment Clause even if the policy does not directly compel 
the exercise of religion.16 There is little remaining debate on this 
type of elementary Establishment Clause question. 
Substantial debate remains, however, on the best way to 
determine whether a specific government policy violates the 
Establishment Clause. This Section provides an overview of the 
various tests adopted by the Court in analyzing potential 
Establishment Clause violations. It does so with the caveat that 
the Supreme Court treats none of these tests as talismanic. The 
Court has been inconsistent about the tests used to analyze 
Establishment Clause cases. It has characterized the tests it does 
 
 13 330 US 1 (1947). 
 14 Id at 15–16. 
 15 See, for example, Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor concurring). 
 16 See Engel, 370 US at 430. 
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employ merely as “helpful signposts.”17 Cases apply multiple 
tests, with little discussion on whether any one is dispositive.18 
Some justices have strongly criticized this “unintelligib[le]” ap-
proach to the interpretation of such an important constitutional 
protection.19 Nevertheless, the Court’s Lemon and Larson tests 
both illuminate how courts should treat religious-questioning 
policies and are therefore detailed in this Section. 
1. The Lemon test. 
The Lemon test is generally considered the guiding, if flick-
ering, light in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.20 The Court 
has applied the Lemon test in a broad array of traditional 
Establishment Clause cases, including those considering whether 
school activity or overt government symbolism violates the 
Establishment Clause.21 Taking its name from Lemon v Kurtzman,22 
the Lemon test was initially described as a three-factor test.23 
Although the Court eventually collapsed the third prong of the 
analysis into the second,24 the original test included (1) whether 
 
 17 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677, 686 (2005), quoting Hunt v McNair, 413 US 734, 
741 (1973). 
 18 See, for example, Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290, 314–17 
(2000) (applying the Lemon test but also considering the endorsement test and historical 
practice). 
 19 Van Orden, 545 US at 697 (Thomas concurring) (“The unintelligibility of this 
Court’s precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudi-
cation of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”). 
 20 See, for example, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc v DeWeese, 
633 F3d 424, 431 (6th Cir 2011). Use of the Lemon test continues despite considerable 
criticism. See, for example, Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 319 
(Rehnquist dissenting) (listing cases that fault Lemon and bemoaning “the sisyphean task 
of trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier described in Lemon”) 
(quotation marks omitted). See also Emily Fitch, Comment, An Inconsistent Truth: The Var-
ious Establishment Clause Tests as Applied in the Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly) 
“Religious” Symbols and Their Applicability Today, 34 NIU L Rev 431, 445 (2014). 
 21 See Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 
773–80 (1973) (holding that tax benefits to parents whose children enrolled in nonpublic 
schools were unconstitutional); Roemer v Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 US 736, 
748–54 (1976) (holding that grants to private religious colleges were constitutional); Santa 
Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 314–16 (holding that school policy permitting 
student-led prayers before school football games was unconstitutional); McCreary County, 
Kentucky v American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 US 844, 859–65 (2005) 
(holding that displays of the Ten Commandments in courthouses were not necessarily 
unconstitutional). 
 22 403 US 602 (1971). 
 23 See id at 612–13. 
 24 See text accompanying notes 52–55. 
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the government policy has a legitimate secular purpose;25 
(2) whether the policy’s primary effect is one of advancing or 
inhibiting religion; and (3) whether the policy creates excessive 
government entanglement with religion.26 A government policy 
violates the Establishment Clause if it “fails to satisfy any of 
these prongs.”27 
The first prong, or the “purpose test,” concerns the “actual 
purpose” of the policy.28 It seeks to expose pretextual purposes 
that obfuscate a policy’s actual religious purpose.29 The object of 
this prong is to “prevent[ ] [the] government from abandoning 
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular 
point of view in religious matters.”30 In general, “no consideration 
of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not 
have a clearly secular purpose.”31 The Court often finds policies to 
have invalid, religious purposes, even when the government has 
provided what purports to be a secular purpose. For example, the 
Court concluded that a policy requiring the posting of the Ten 
Commandments in a school was religious, even though the 
Government argued that it was intended to promote “the funda-
mental legal code of Western Civilization.”32 In another case, the 
Court rejected as insincere a school’s claim that it required the 
teaching of creationism alongside evolution to “protect academic 
freedom.”33 It found, in contrast, that a voucher program meant 
to provide assistance to poor children in a failing school district 
furthered a valid secular purpose even though students could use 
the vouchers at religious schools.34 
The second prong, the “effects test,” or “endorsement test,” is 
often the crux of the analysis. It considers, from an objective view-
point, “whether the government action has the purpose or effect” 
of either endorsing or disapproving of religion.35 The Court has 
 
 25 Though originally articulated as a secular legislative purpose, the Court has since 
applied the purpose prong broadly to “legislation or governmental action.” Lynch, 465 US 
at 680. 
 26 Lemon, 403 US at 612–13. 
 27 Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 583 (1987). 
 28 Lynch, 465 US at 690 (O’Connor concurring). 
 29 See Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 56 (1985). 
 30 McCreary County, 545 US at 860, quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos, 483 US 327, 335 (1987). 
 31 Wallace, 472 US at 56. 
 32 Stone v Graham, 449 US 39, 41 (1980). 
 33 Edwards, 482 US at 586–87. 
 34 See Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 649, 653 (2002). 
 35 DeWeese, 633 F3d at 434 (quotation marks omitted). 
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always understood endorsement and disapproval of religion as 
opposite sides of the same coin. It prohibits both because they 
reach beyond the governmental powers as “circumscribed by the 
Constitution.”36 “[C]rucial” to this analysis is that “a government 
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”37 A govern-
mental policy does not need to succeed in promoting or degrading 
a religion to violate the Establishment Clause. What matters is 
whether a reasonable observer would understand the policy to be 
motivated by a desire to endorse or disapprove of religion.38 
Courts take a fact-intensive and context-sensitive approach to 
this analysis. 
To invalidate a policy under the effects test, courts must find 
that endorsement or disapproval of religion is the primary effect 
of a policy. For example, the Supreme Court concluded that a city’s 
public display of a nativity scene did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because the promotion of religion was not its primary ef-
fect. Instead, the Court found that the primary effect of the crèche 
was to promote a “significant historical religious event . . . long 
recognized as a National Holiday.”39 The Court also noted that: 
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the crèche 
is to advance religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause would require that we view it as more beneficial to 
and more an endorsement of religion, for example, than 
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks sup-
plied throughout the country to students attending church-
sponsored schools.40 
This holding shows the Court’s willingness to look beyond the 
overtly religious nature of a nativity scene in its Establishment 
Clause analysis. It simultaneously hints at the Court’s desire to 
avoid holdings that will invalidate a significant number of other 
government policies. This is not to say that the Court is never 
willing to find endorsement. Examples of government actions that 
 
 36 School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203, 222 (1963). 
 37 Lynch, 465 US at 692 (O’Connor concurring) (emphasis added). 
 38 See Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 316 (“Therefore, the simple 
enactment of this policy, with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student 
prayer, was a constitutional violation. . . . Government efforts to endorse religion cannot 
evade constitutional reproach based solely on the remote possibility that those attempts 
may fail.”). 
 39 Lynch, 465 US at 680. 
 40 Id at 681. 
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courts have struck down because of their unconstitutional effects 
include pregame prayers at football games41 and an “editorialized” 
version of the Ten Commandments in an Ohio state court that 
“exhort[ed] a return to ‘moral absolutes.’”42 
Both the purpose and the effects prongs of the Lemon test are 
objective, meaning they are based on how a reasonable observer 
would understand the policies rather than on the government’s 
subjective intent.43 The concern is that a government policy of 
religious endorsement or disapproval will impermissibly “send[ ] 
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community.”44 This is why the core of the 
analysis is not what the government intends the policy to do but 
what reasonable observers would understand the policy to do.45 
Circuit courts have understood this guidance as militating 
against policies that treat certain religious participants as “second-
class citizens,”46 “leav[e] members of minority faiths unwilling 
participants” in public activities,47 or require average citizens to 
“burrow into a difficult-to-access legislative record for evidence to 
assure themselves that the government is not endorsing a reli-
gious view.”48 
The Court has provided little guidance on exactly what this 
“reasonable observer” knows, with justices acknowledging (almost 
apologetically) that there is considerable judicial discretion to 
determine exactly what a reasonable observer would know in any 
situation.49 When deciding how the reasonable observer would 
react to a government policy, lower courts assume that the rea-
sonable observer has knowledge of the history and context of the 
community in question. This is not “the everyday casual 
 
 41 Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 312 (finding that the effect of 
pregame prayers was to impermissibly pressure students to participate in worship). 
 42 DeWeese, 633 F3d at 434–35 (finding that this display of the Ten Commandments 
had the effect of endorsing religion). 
 43 See McCreary County, 545 US at 862 (noting that “the eyes that look to purpose 
belong to an ‘objective observer’” and do not call for “psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of 
hearts”). 
 44 Lynch, 465 US at 688 (O’Connor concurring). 
 45 See id at 690 (O’Connor concurring); Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 
US at 308. 
 46 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v City and County of San Francisco, 
624 F3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir 2010). 
 47 Lund v Rowan County, North Carolina, 863 F3d 268, 290 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc). 
 48 Felix v City of Bloomfield, 841 F3d 848, 863–64 (10th Cir 2016). 
 49 See, for example, Utah Highway Patrol Association v American Atheists, Inc, 565 
US 994, 1004 (2011) (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“One might be forgiven 
for failing to discern a workable principle that explains these wildly divergent outcomes.”). 
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gawker.”50 Circuit-court cases suggest that courts generally 
assume the reasonable observer adapts to the times and has fairly 
extensive familiarity with the precise community in question 
(down to the local county history).51 
The third prong of the Lemon test, assessing government 
entanglement with religion, has largely been subsumed into the 
analysis of the second prong. In the 1997 case Agostini v Felton,52 
the Supreme Court explicitly folded the third prong into the 
second.53 It has since argued that “[t]his made sense because both 
inquiries rely on the same evidence and the degree of entangle-
ment has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits 
religion.”54 Therefore, courts now consider ongoing and excessive 
government entanglement with religion as evidence that a policy 
fails the effects test.55 
As with Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally, 
courts do not have bright-line rules to determine when entangle-
ment violates the Establishment Clause. Courts acknowledge 
that the line between religion and the government resembles a 
“blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier,” rather than a wall.56 
“Fire inspections [and] building and zoning regulations . . . are 
examples of necessary and permissible contacts” between religion 
and the government.57 “Entanglement” becomes unconstitutional 
when these “contacts” morph into unnecessary “intrusion.”58 
Impermissible entanglement occurred in Lemon. The Court 
considered statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that used 
state money to fund religious elementary and middle schools, 
provided those funds supported secular education within those 
 
 50 Cressman v Thompson, 798 F3d 938, 958 (10th Cir 2015). See also American Civil 
Liberties Union of Kentucky v Mercer County, 432 F3d 624, 636 (6th Cir 2005). 
 51 See, for example, Freethought Society, of Greater Philadelphia v Chester County, 
334 F3d 247, 260 (3d Cir 2003) (“[W]e will assume that the reasonable observer is informed 
about the approximate age of the plaque and the fact that the County has done nothing 
with the plaque since it was erected; we also conclude that the reasonable observer is 
aware of the general history of Chester County.”). 
 52 521 US 203 (1997). 
 53 Id at 232–35. 
 54 Zelman, 536 US at 668–69 (citation omitted). See also Agostini, 521 US at 218, 
232–33. 
 55 See Agostini, 521 US at 218, 232–33. As discussed in Part II.B, the two district-
court decisions that inspired this Comment both incorrectly analyzed this prong under 
Agostini, treating it as an independent part of the analysis. 
 56 Lemon, 403 US at 614. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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schools akin to that offered in public schools.59 The Court held that 
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance” 
would have been required to ensure that secular teachers in 
parochial schools abided by the requirements for teachers in 
public schools.60 The Lemon decision shows that the entanglement 
inquiry, now used only as supporting evidence in the effects test, 
requires courts to interrogate the “character,” “nature,” and “re-
sulting relationship” of any government interaction with religion 
in order to gauge whether the interaction crosses the line into 
unconstitutional intrusion.61 
2. The Larson test. 
Although the Lemon test remains the primary test that courts 
use to determine when state actions violate the Establishment 
Clause, the Court has developed another Establishment Clause 
test for cases involving government actions that discriminate 
among religions rather than endorse or disparage religion as a 
whole. This test was first articulated in Larson v Valente.62 
In Larson, the Supreme Court considered government-
imposed reporting and registration requirements that applied to 
only a subset of religions (those that solicited more than fifty 
percent of their funds from nonmembers).63 Larson held that 
strict scrutiny should be applied in cases in which a government 
policy suggests a “denominational preference” between religions.64 
When reviewing such a policy, the Lemon principles can offer 
helpful guidance. However, Lemon is not the proper test to use to 
analyze the policy.65 
To survive strict scrutiny under the Larson test, as in other 
contexts, the government must show that its policy furthers a 
“compelling governmental interest” and is “closely fitted to fur-
ther that interest.”66 The government has a compelling interest 
only if it can prove that its policy addresses an “actual concrete 
problem”: “For an interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify 
 
 59 Id at 606–07. 
 60 Lemon, 403 US at 619. 
 61 Id at 615. 
 62 456 US 228 (1982). 
 63 Id at 230. 
 64 Id at 245. 
 65 See id at 251–52 (“The [Lemon test is] intended to apply to laws affording a uni-
form benefit to all religions, and not to provisions, like [the law considered in Larson], that 
discriminate among religions.”) (citation omitted). 
 66 Larson, 456 US at 246–47. 
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a law that discriminates among religions, the interest must 
address an identified problem that the discrimination seeks to 
remedy.”67 After this interest is identified, the government must 
demonstrate that it has “closely fitted” its policy “to further that 
interest.”68 For example, in Awad v Ziriax,69 a recent Tenth Circuit 
case invalidating a proposed Oklahoma state constitutional ban 
on the invocation of Sharia law in court, the court reasoned that 
“[e]ven if the state could identify and support a reason to single 
out and restrict Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete 
ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”70 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the frequency with which strict 
scrutiny is used in other constitutional contexts, courts rarely use 
the Larson test.71 In fact, before the Awad court analyzed the ban 
on Sharia law, it discussed whether the infrequent use of Larson 
had in fact rendered it bad law. It concluded that rare application 
of a doctrine did not invalidate a Supreme Court precedent that 
had never been explicitly overturned.72 There are several possible 
explanations for courts’ rare reliance on Larson. For one, the 
unpredictable application of Larson may simply represent a 
symptom of the general inconsistency in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. Another potential reason is that Larson is in fact 
obsolete. If so, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly concluded that Larson 
applied in Awad. The Supreme Court’s own actions, however, sug-
gest that Larson remains a viable, if secondary, Establishment 
Clause test.73 While citations to Larson are rare, they exist: the 
Supreme Court has cited Larson in just under two dozen cases 
since its publication.74 Another explanation is that courts so 
rarely employ Larson because they are more likely to scrutinize 
government preferences among religions when the government is 
disapproving of a religion. They may be less wary of policies that 
 
 67 Awad v Ziriax, 670 F3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir 2012), citing Brown v Entertainment 
Merchants Association, 564 US 786, 799 (2011). 
 68 Larson, 456 US at 247. 
 69 670 F3d 1111 (10th Cir 2012). 
 70 Id at 1131. 
 71 See Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson 
in Retrospect, 8 NY City L Rev 53, 76–87 (2005) (discussing the infrequent use of Larson 
by the Supreme Court). 
 72 See Awad, 670 F3d at 1127–28. 
 73 See Patrick-Justice, 8 NY City L Rev at 76–87, 120 (cited in note 71) (discussing 
how Larson is on the “peripher[y]” of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but 
remains an active doctrine). 
 74 See id at 76. 
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endorse individual religions or less likely to view those as discrim-
inating among religions. If that were the case, courts might be 
more likely to apply Larson in disapproval-of-religion cases. Both 
Larson and Awad can be distinguished from cases like Lynch 
based on the fact that they involved government practices that 
were critical—rather than approving—of a religion. Disapproval-
of-religion cases are rarer than endorsement cases,75 which could 
explain why courts rarely apply Larson. However, as discussed in 
Part I.B, even when confronted with government actions disap-
proving of beliefs or practices associated with particular religious 
traditions, courts frequently apply the Lemon test rather than the 
Larson test.76 
The most promising explanation for why courts rarely rely on 
Larson is probably that the Supreme Court’s narrow understand-
ing of what it means for a policy to facially discriminate among 
religions limits the situations in which Larson may apply. In fact, 
many cases analyzed under the Lemon doctrine concern a practice 
that implicates a denominational preference. Consider the crèche 
case discussed earlier, Lynch v Donnelly.77 It is hard to argue that 
this case involved government endorsement of religion generally. 
If the government’s actions constituted an endorsement of anything, 
it was of Christianity. Nevertheless, the Court did not apply Larson 
on the grounds that the Larson test applies only when a policy is 
“patently discriminat[ing]” among religions.78 This holding 
suggests that a policy concerning “generalized Christianity” or 
theism does not count as facial discrimination.79 Thus, a policy 
that preferences Christianity as opposed to other religions is gen-
erally insufficient to trigger Larson strict scrutiny. A showing of 
a more specific denominational target is required. The Tenth 
Circuit in Awad based its unusual decision to apply the Larson 
strict scrutiny test on the fact that the law in question invalidated 
only Sharia law, as opposed to all religious laws. The court took this 
to mean that the law was truly discriminating among religions.80 
 
 75 See note 92. 
 76 See, for example, C.F. v Capistrano Unified School District, 615 F Supp 2d 1137, 
1145 (CD Cal 2009), vacd on other grounds, 654 F3d 975 (9th Cir 2011). 
 77 465 US 668, 681 (1984). For more discussion of the complexity of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, see Part I.A.3 (introducing cases that rely on neither the Larson nor 
the Lemon test). 
 78 Lynch, 465 US at 687 n 13. 
 79 See id. See also Patrick-Justice, 8 NY City L Rev at 81 (cited in note 71). 
 80 See Awad, 670 F3d at 1128. 
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3. Other tests. 
Lemon and Larson are hardly the only tests courts use in 
Establishment Clause cases. However, other tests—including the 
endorsement test, neutrality principle, and coercion test—are less 
useful as analytic tools in the religious-questioning cases consid-
ered in this Comment.81 The endorsement test is itself just an 
elaboration of the Lemon test’s second prong, first articulated by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her influential concurrence in 
Lynch.82 The neutrality principle—asking whether a government 
practice is neutral toward religion—is embedded within the 
Establishment Clause and the other Establishment Clause tests, 
including the Lemon test. It is not its own independent test.83 
Finally, the coercion test, which questions whether a government 
practice is coercive to individuals, is not the law84—a majority of 
the Supreme Court has not embraced the coercion test. Instead, 
concurring or dissenting opinions occasionally recommend its 
adoption.85 Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has used the 
coercion test in his arguments that the scope of the Establishment 
Clause should be narrowed.86 
A recent Supreme Court trend, evident in Van Orden v 
Perry,87 is to ground Establishment Clause analyses in historical 
practice.88 In Van Orden, the Court explicitly stated that the 
Lemon test was not helpful when dealing with “passive monu-
ment[s],” such as a statue of the Ten Commandments on the 
grounds of the Texas state capitol.89 Similar to the neutrality 
principle, historical practice is not a stand-alone test. The Court 
instead simply decided to give significant deference to past 
 
 81 For a detailed discussion of these tests, see Fitch, Comment, 34 NIU L Rev at 435–
44 (cited in note 20). 
 82 See Lynch, 465 US at 687–90 (O’Connor concurring). O’Connor’s concurrence from 
Lynch is widely cited, including by the Supreme Court, and treated as very influential, if 
not binding, law. See Fitch, Comment, 34 NIU L Rev at 436–37 (cited in note 20). 
 83 See Good News Club v Milford Central School, 533 US 98, 114 (2001); Rosenberger 
v Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US 819, 839 (1995) (“A central lesson 
of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face 
of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”). 
 84 See Van Orden, 545 US at 694 (Thomas concurring). 
 85 See, for example, County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US 573, 659–60 (1989) (Kennedy concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
 86 See, for example, Van Orden, 545 US at 694–98 (Thomas concurring). 
 87 545 US 677 (2005). 
 88 See id at 686. 
 89 Id. 
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practice: “[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of 
the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific 
practice is permitted . . . and has withstood the critical scrutiny 
of time and political change.”90 The Supreme Court, when it relies 
on evidence of longstanding practice, uses history as a proxy for 
the constitutionality of a government policy. The historical-
practice trend has identified a kind of evidence particularly 
relevant in Establishment Clause cases but has not replaced the 
principles encoded in the Lemon test.91 
B. Disapproving of, Rather Than Endorsing, Religion 
Excepting Larson and Awad, the Establishment Clause vio-
lations discussed so far have involved government endorsement 
of religion. This is because the vast majority of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence involves endorsement. There are only a few 
cases that apply the Establishment Clause to disapproval of a 
religion.92 However, government policies that disapprove of or 
express hostility toward a religion undeniably violate the 
Establishment Clause.93 In Everson, the Supreme Court clearly 
stated that the Establishment Clause not only proscribes en-
dorsement but also “punish[ment]” of religious beliefs.94 This 
 
 90 Town of Greece v Galloway, 134 S Ct 1811, 1819 (2014). 
 91 See id at 1818–19 (citations omitted): 
[Marsh v Chambers] is sometimes described as “carving out an exception” to the 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, because it sustained legislative 
prayer without subjecting the practice to “any of the formal ‘tests’ that have 
traditionally structured” this inquiry. The Court in Marsh found those tests un-
necessary because history supported the conclusion that legislative invocations 
are compatible with the Establishment Clause. . . . Yet Marsh must not be un-
derstood as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation 
if not for its historical foundation. 
See also Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 800–02 (1983) (Brennan dissenting). 
 92 See American Family Association, Inc v City and County of San Francisco, 277 
F3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir 2002) (“[B]ecause it is far more typical for an Establishment 
Clause case to challenge instances in which the government has done something that 
favors religion or a particular religious group, we have little guidance concerning what 
constitutes a primary effect of inhibiting religion.”). See also Jay Wexler, Government 
Disapproval of Religion, 2013 BYU L Rev 119, 120–24 (discussing the “exceedingly rare” 
use of the disapproval side of the Establishment Clause). 
 93 See Vasquez v Los Angeles County, 487 F3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir 2007) (“Although 
Lemon is most frequently invoked in cases involving alleged governmental preferences to 
religion, the test also ‘accommodates the analysis of a claim brought under a hostility to 
religion theory.’”), citing American Family Association, 277 F3d at 1121. 
 94 Everson, 330 US at 15–16. 
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Comment focuses on the disapproval side of the Establishment 
Clause coin. 
While the Supreme Court has offered little guidance in this 
area, recent circuit-court decisions provide a framework for 
understanding what type of government policy violates the 
Establishment Clause by disapproving of religion. They also 
demonstrate that courts approach such fact patterns in the same 
fact-specific, and occasionally doctrinally inconsistent, way as 
endorsement cases. Several benchmark cases applying the Lemon 
framework come from the Ninth Circuit. In Vasquez v Los Angeles 
County,95 the court held that a county government removing a 
cross from a county seal was appropriate, as it was not “motivated 
by hostility toward Christianity”—it was, in fact, motivated by 
the legitimate secular purpose of avoiding an Establishment 
Clause lawsuit.96 Similarly, in Vernon v City of Los Angeles,97 a 
government investigation into an assistant police chief’s religious 
practices did not violate the Establishment Clause.98 The court 
applied a Lemon analysis without mentioning Larson, even 
though the investigation focused on Robert Vernon’s involvement 
with a specific sect, the Grace Community Church.99 The court 
held that the investigation was appropriately motivated by 
Vernon’s erratic job performance.100 He had been quoted as depict-
ing the police as “ministers of God,” ordering that no one was to 
be arrested at pro-life demonstrations, and pressuring police 
officers to attend church services.101 The investigation focused 
narrowly on whether his religious beliefs were impermissibly 
affecting his job duties, the questioning did not represent an on-
going policy, and the officers investigating him explicitly told him 
they were not telling him what his religious beliefs should be.102 
The Tenth Circuit’s Awad decision, discussed in Part I.A.2, 
also explored disapproval of religion. The court decided that the 
Larson test was the best approach when scrutinizing a proposed 
 
 95 487 F3d 1246 (9th Cir 2007). 
 96 Id at 1255. 
 97 27 F3d 1385 (9th Cir 1994). 
 98 See id at 1396–1401. 
 99 Id at 1388, 1396–1401. 
 100 Id at 1388–89. 
 101 See Vernon, 27 F3d at 1388–89. 
 102 See id at 1388–89, 1398–99. See also American Family Association, 277 F3d at 
1121–23 (holding that a city prohibition on anti-gay advertisements paid for by religious 
groups had a secular purpose and a primary effect of “encouraging equal rights for gays 
and discouraging hate crimes,” not of “inhibiting” religion). 
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state constitutional amendment that would outlaw Sharia law in 
Oklahoma courts.103 Unlike the Ninth Circuit cases, therefore, the 
Tenth Circuit eschewed the Lemon test in this disapproval-of-
religion case. Under this alternative lens, the court found that the 
policy did not address a “concrete problem” or support a compel-
ling interest and likely violated the Establishment Clause: “[T]o 
sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is 
not warranted.”104 
A line of cases that sheds light on the specific concerns raised 
by religious-questioning policies involves policies of disparaging 
remarks toward a religion. In the 1983 case Marsh v Chambers,105 
the Court noted that such policies can violate the Establishment 
Clause.106 A district court in California offered examples of state-
ments that fall on both sides of the “disparaging” line in C.F. v 
Capistrano Unified School District.107 It found that a teacher’s 
comment that creationism was “religious, superstitious 
nonsense” violated the Establishment Clause by disapproving of 
a religion.108 Other comments the teacher made for educational 
purposes and not to demonstrate his own beliefs (such as, “What 
was it that Mark Twain said? ‘Religion was invented when the 
first con man met the first fool.’”) did not rise to the level of a 
violation.109 The court did not buy the argument that the “super-
stitious” statement was made for the secular purpose of educa-
tion, concluding instead it was “unequivocal[ly]” driven by the 
belief that such religious beliefs actually were nonsense.110 The 
teacher could have easily taught the lesson without “disparaging 
those views.”111 
 
 103 Awad, 670 F3d at 1116, 1126–29. 
 104 Id at 1130 (quotation marks omitted). 
 105 463 US 783 (1983). 
 106 Id at 794–95 (“The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, 
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or 
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”) (emphasis added). 
 107 615 F Supp 2d 1137, 1146–49 (CD Cal 2009), vacd on other grounds, 654 F3d at 
978, 988 (granting the teacher qualified immunity, but acknowledging that “[a]t some 
point a teacher’s comments on religion might cross the line and rise to the level of unconsti-
tutional hostility”). For more discussion, see generally Jennifer L. Bryant, Note, Talking 
“Religious, Superstitious Nonsense” in the Classroom: When Do Teachers’ Disparaging Com-
ments about Religion Run Afoul of the Establishment Clause?, 86 S Cal L Rev 1343 (2013). 
 108 Capistrano, 615 F Supp 2d at 1146. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id at 1149. 
 111 Id. 
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Town of Greece v Galloway,112 which concerned a prayer pro-
gram at monthly town board meetings, offered an additional stand-
ard for which statements rise to the level of an Establishment 
Clause violation. Town of Greece held that disparaging but one-
off comments that are part of a larger, nondisparaging whole 
likely do not rise to the level of a prohibited government act.113 
This included the comment by a visiting minister at one of the 
town meetings that an “ignorant” religious minority did not 
respect the history of the country.114 The Capistrano decisions (at 
the district and appellate levels) both acknowledged this require-
ment, suggesting that the “religious, superstitious nonsense” 
statement impermissibly signaled government disapproval of a 
religion, but that the plaintiff also had to demonstrate “ongoing 
entanglement.”115 Though courts have offered little guidance on 
the precise character of remarks required to meet this threshold 
of religious disapproval, a policy of disparaging remarks can 
clearly rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation. 
This Comment builds on this line of cases to explore a new 
type of disapproval-of-religion policy—religious questioning—in 
order to see how the Establishment Clause can adapt to and in-
form a new type of government entanglement with religion. 
C. How the Establishment Clause Interacts with Other 
Potential Claims 
It is important to note that this Comment’s focus on the 
Establishment Clause is not intended to suggest that religious 
questioning does not implicate other constitutional protections. 
Relevant provisions likely include the Free Exercise Clause116 and 
the Equal Protection Clause.117 Plaintiffs could also bring statu-
tory claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993118 (RFRA), among other acts. 
 
 112 134 S Ct 1811 (2014). 
 113 See id at 1824. 
 114 Id (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an 
impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer 
will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”). 
 115 Capistrano, 615 F Supp 2d at 1153. See also Capistrano, 654 F3d at 986. 
 116 US Const Amend I, cl 1 (preventing the government from “prohibiting the free 
exercise” of religion). 
 117 US Const Amend XIV, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 118 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq. 
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The Establishment Clause is not merely redundant, though; 
it provides unique guidance for what types of government entan-
glement with religion are permissible. The jurisprudence sur-
rounding the Establishment Clause reflects the Court’s attempts 
to balance the “unbroken history of official acknowledgment” of the 
role of religion in “American life” with the mandated separation 
of church and state.119 It provides a framework to navigate the 
complicated role of religion in American society.120 It also analyzes 
these questions from a different angle than its sister clause in the 
Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause.121 Finally, it does so more 
thoroughly than the Free Exercise Clause—there is significantly 
more case law and Court guidance on the Establishment 
Clause.122 
Besides offering helpful guidance for religious-questioning 
cases, the Establishment Clause offers litigants different paths to 
success in court. Policies analyzed under the Equal Protection 
Clause,123 the Free Exercise Clause,124 and RFRA125 generally all 
face strict scrutiny. Some policies that fail this test would none-
theless survive under the various Establishment Clause tests 
described in Part I, and vice versa. There are also instances when 
a plaintiff may have standing to bring an Establishment Clause 
claim but not a Free Exercise or RFRA claim. To bring a Free 
Exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege a “substantial burden” on 
his religious practices.126 Courts have held that increased financial 
 
 119 See Van Orden, 545 US at 683–86 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Lynch, 465 
US at 674. 
 120 See, for example, Van Orden, 545 US at 683–84 (discussing how every Establishment 
Clause case must recognize that “[o]ur institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” and that 
the Court must flexibly respond to this history by “neither abdicat[ing] our responsibility 
to maintain a division between church and state nor evinc[ing] a hostility to religion by 
disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage”). 
 121 See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L Rev 
299, 306 (“[T]he establishment clause focuses on the protection of government from the 
encroachment of the church . . . while the free exercise clause reflects [ ] the . . . view of 
protecting religion from the state.”). 
 122 Id at 306 n 34. 
 123 See, for example, City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493–94 (1989). 
 124 Although the phrase “strict scrutiny” is not often used in the Free Exercise Clause 
context (whose case law at times mirrors the confusion seen in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence), courts apply the “most exacting scrutiny” and look for “compelling” 
government interests. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer, 137 S Ct 2012, 
2021, 2024 (2017). 
 125 See, for example, Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
US 418, 430 (2006). 
 126 See Patel v United States Bureau of Prisons, 515 F3d 807, 813 (8th Cir 2008) (de-
scribing how this burden must “significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression 
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costs of practicing a religion127 and a lack of access to halal food in 
prison128 do not constitute substantial burdens. RFRA has similar 
practical limitations129 and applies only to federal officials.130 
Given these precedents, temporary religious questioning like that 
in Cherri and Isakhanova that does not alter a plaintiff’s religious 
practices will likely not reach the level of a substantial burden. 
The Establishment Clause analysis does not demand an individ-
ual demonstrate such a burden.131 As long as standard standing 
requirements132 are met, a plaintiff can bring an Establishment 
Clause claim even if the questioning does not alter his religious 
practices before or after the religious questioning occurs. 
* * * 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not provide clear-
cut rules for testing the constitutionality of government policies 
that invoke religion. Recent court practice suggests that the 
Lemon test remains the prevailing Establishment Clause test, but 
that other tests, such as the Larson test, are appropriate in cer-
tain factual scenarios. This unsettled legal landscape is even less 
developed in disapproval-of-religion cases. As the cases discussed 
in Part I.B demonstrate, courts have generally analyzed dispar-
aging remarks toward religion under traditional Establishment 
Clause frameworks. Importantly, they have demonstrated a will-
ingness to find that such policies violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
 
that manifests some central tenet of a person’s individual religious beliefs,” “meaningfully 
curtail a person’s ability to express adherence to his or her faith,” or “deny a person reason-
able opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion”), 
citing Murphy v Missouri Department of Corrections, 372 F3d 979, 988 (8th Cir 2004). 
 127 See Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599, 605 (1961). 
 128 See Patel, 515 F3d at 814. 
 129 The Court has found that RFRA applies when an individual “alleges a substantial 
burden on his or her free exercise of religion.” City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 532 (1997). 
 130 Id at 536. Only twenty-nine states have adopted state-level RFRAs. See Ira C. 
Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 Ala 
CR & CL L Rev 1, 48–49 (2015). RFRA expands the protections granted by the Free Exercise 
Clause by extending scrutiny to “neutral, generally applicable” laws that “incidentally” 
burden religious exercise, which are not the type of policy considered in this Comment. 
Holt v Hobbs, 135 S Ct 853, 859 (2015). 
 131 See Galloway v Town of Greece, 681 F3d 20, 30 n 4 (2d Cir 2012), revd on other 
grounds, 134 S Ct 1811 (discussing the broad standing available for Establishment Clause 
claims). 
 132 For a brief summary of modern standing requirements, see Lujan v Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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II.  RELIGIOUS QUESTIONING BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
Though the Establishment Clause provides a helpful lens 
through which to analyze disapproval-of-religion policies, one 
subset of these policies that has still received almost no attention 
from courts is religious questioning. This type of questioning 
raises thornier Establishment Clause questions than the kind of 
questioning at stake in cases like Vernon. The questioning of 
Vernon was prompted by and tailored to his job performance.133 
In contrast, the government questioning in the two district-court 
cases analyzed in this Part, Cherri and Isakhanova, was 
prompted by nothing other than the plaintiffs’ apparent religion. 
This Part concludes that religious questioning of this kind raises 
novel, underexplored Establishment Clause issues that deserve 
more attention than courts have afforded them. 
A. Relevant District-Court Cases 
Of the two cases, Cherri presents the more challenging fact 
pattern. In Cherri, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents (collectively, “border 
agents”) questioned the plaintiffs—Muslim American citizens—
about their religion when crossing the US-Canada border.134 The 
questioning was prompted “solely” by the apparent religion of the 
plaintiffs and a perceived connection between this religion and 
“terrorist activities.”135 Questions included “Which mosque do you 
go to?”; “How many times a day do you pray?”; “Who is your reli-
gious leader?”; and “Do you perform your morning prayer at the 
mosque?”136 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants “implemented a policy . . . which include[d] asking 
Muslim American travelers a substantially similar set of ques-
tions about their Islamic beliefs and practices.”137 The plaintiffs 
alleged similar practices at no fewer than seven other border 
entry points, with questions including “When did you become a 
Muslim?”; “Are there any extremists or terrorists at the 
mosque?”; and “Do you know any terrorists?”138 
 
 133 See Vernon, 27 F3d at 1388–89. 
 134 See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 923–27. 
 135 Id at 927, 935. 
 136 Id at 924. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 926. The defendants had previously explored the legality 
of these policies internally, finding little guidance from the courts. See id at 924–25. 
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The Cherri court found the plaintiffs did not have an 
Establishment Clause claim and granted the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment and RFRA claims.139 
The court reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions did not state a claim under what it viewed as the three 
prongs of the Lemon test.140 First, the plaintiffs did not, the court 
concluded, allege the policy had a “religious objective.” Second, 
the court held that a reasonable person would not conclude that 
the religious questioning they experienced constituted an endorse-
ment of religion. Finally, the plaintiffs did not state facts estab-
lishing excessive government entanglement.141 The court argued 
that an Equal Protection Clause claim was “better suited” to the 
facts.142 
A few years later, the Isakhanova court also addressed 
whether religious questioning by a government official violated 
the Establishment Clause. In Isakhanova, the Muslim mother of 
a state prison inmate faced religious questioning and disparaging 
remarks about Islam after prison guards detained her on suspicion 
of sneaking tobacco to her son.143 She was asked questions like 
“What kind of Muslim are you—Sunni or Shia?”; “Do you pray five 
times a day?”; and “What mosque do you go to?” She was told “All 
Muslims are terrorists” and “America is no place for Muslims.”144 
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.145 It 
found that the “derogatory comments” made by the prison guards 
to the plaintiff violated the Lemon test.146 Because the prison 
guards were allegedly searching the plaintiff for tobacco, there 
was no clear “secular purpose” for their religious questioning and 
“statements such as ‘All Muslims are terrorists’ would be per-
ceived by any reasonable Muslim as ‘disapproval of their individ-
ual religious choices.’”147 Finally, “under the third prong of Lemon, 
statements such as, ‘America is no place for Muslims,’ foster 
excessive governmental entanglement with religion, because they 
 
 139 See id at 937–38. The court did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims. Id. 
 140 Id at 933–36. 
 141 Id at 936. 
 142 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 936–37. For a discussion of what an Establishment 
Clause analysis adds, see Part I.C. 
 143 See Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *1, 5–6. 
 144 Id at *5–6. 
 145 See id at *1. 
 146 Id at *5–6. 
 147 Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6.  
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run afoul of the prohibition against ‘making adherence to a reli-
gion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political 
community.’”148 
B. Limitations of the District-Court Decisions 
Neither Cherri nor Isakhanova provided a satisfying analysis 
of the Establishment Clause issues raised by religious question-
ing of the type the plaintiffs in those cases experienced. For one 
thing, both opinions appear to oversimplify Supreme Court prec-
edent: each applied the Lemon test without discussing whether it 
was the proper Establishment Clause test for the situation and 
without acknowledging developments in Lemon jurisprudence, 
such as the effective elimination of the third prong.149 
Furthermore, each case discussed the Lemon test only briefly 
and the cases came to opposite conclusions through largely con-
clusory statements. The cases are in some ways distinguishable 
on their facts. The prison guard in Isakhanova explicitly insulted 
Islam. It is hard to think of any motivation for his comments other 
than animus toward the religion. The questions asked by the bor-
der agents in Cherri cannot be as easily dismissed as extraneous. 
Those factual differences should not obscure the fact that the two 
courts also applied the law inconsistently. While the Isakhanova 
court relied on Cherri in its decision to apply Lemon, it did not 
address these inconsistencies.150 
Take each court’s discussion of the first Lemon prong (the 
purpose test). In Cherri, the court stated that the government’s 
“claimed association between [the plaintiffs’] Islamic beliefs and 
terrorist activities” did not demonstrate a religious objective.151 
The Isakhanova court inferred a religious objective based on the 
government’s failure to demonstrate a legitimate association 
between the plaintiff’s Islamic beliefs and criminal activities 
(sneaking in tobacco).152 At an abstract level, the same thing hap-
pened in each instance: a government official asked questions 
about religious practices in the context of an investigation into 
whether the plaintiff had committed a crime. The Cherri court 
saw a secular purpose for this questioning; the Isakhanova court 
 
 148 Id, citing Lynch, 465 US at 687 (O’Connor concurring). 
 149 See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 933–36; Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *5.  See 
also text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 150 See Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *5. 
 151 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 935. 
 152 Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6. 
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did not. The legal grounding for those different findings is 
unclear. Because of the different contexts and considerations 
involved in each case, the opposite findings may have actually 
been completely justified. As a matter of common sense, questions 
about Islam are more probative when considering potential 
terrorist activities than when considering smuggled tobacco.153 
The Isakhanova court did not, however, explicitly ground its hold-
ing in any type of showing that the interrogation in Cherri was 
more likely to uncover crimes than that in Isakhanova. The 
Cherri court did not discuss whether the government’s purpose 
was pretextual, and thus invalid, as the Isakhanova court did.154 
The Cherri court did not suggest that the questions asked were 
likely to actually root out terrorist activity, implying that an 
initial association between a religious belief and a crime allows 
for indiscriminate questioning about that religious belief. It did 
not distinguish between questions asked or consider whether 
some expressed unconstitutional animus toward a religion, even 
if others did not. It did not explore whether a reasonable observer 
would understand specific questions like “Do you consider your-
self a religious person?” and “Are you part of any Islamic tribes?” 
to have a religious objective.155 
These same inconsistencies apply to each court’s conclusions 
about whether a reasonable person would find the questioning to 
express disapproval of religion under the effects test.156 The effects 
prong of the Lemon test looks at the message communicated by a 
policy, not the factors motivating the policy.157 Despite this, the 
Cherri court did not ask whether a reasonable observer would 
think that questions like “Are there any extremists or terrorists 
at [your] mosque?” would make the plaintiffs feel as though they 
were not complete members of the “political community.”158 It did 
not explore the salience of a government policy explicitly connect-
ing the practice of a religion with terrorist activities. In fact, it 
concluded that these questions merely stopped the plaintiffs from 
“cross[ing] the border in a timely fashion” and did not “endors[e]” 
a religion—without mentioning that the Establishment Clause 
 
 153 For a discussion on why courts cannot merely rely on this type of “common sense,” 
see text accompanying notes 167–81. 
 154 See text accompanying notes 30–34. 
 155 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 926. 
 156 See id at 935–36; Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6. 
 157 See text accompanying notes 35–38. 
 158 Lynch, 465 US at 687. 
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also prohibits disapproval of a religion.159 In its decision, the 
Isakhanova court did not criticize Cherri. It also did not explain 
why a reasonable observer would think a government official con-
necting Islam with tobacco smuggling disapproves of a religion, 
even though connecting it with terrorism (certainly a worse crime) 
does not. It did not explain why comments like “All Muslims are 
terrorists” violate the Establishment Clause even though leading 
questions from Cherri like “Do you know any terrorists?” do not. 
Neither court acknowledged the likely fact that they were making 
their assumptions based on common sense. Both courts may indeed 
have been satisfied that all of these concerns were misplaced, but 
this lack of discussion leaves unclear which differences supported 
opposite conclusions in Cherri and Isakhanova, as well as 
whether the courts were correct to rely on those differences. 
Using these cases’ fact patterns as a starting point, this 
Comment more carefully explores the Establishment Clause con-
cerns triggered by a government policy of asking questions re-
garding religious practices, and the difficult question of what test 
should be employed in such cases. 
III.  APPLYING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TO RELIGIOUS-
QUESTIONING POLICIES USING THE LEMON-LARSON TEST 
This Part picks up where the Cherri and Isakhanova courts 
left off, analyzing when religious-questioning policies violate the 
Establishment Clause. It argues that neither the Lemon nor the 
Larson test provides an adequate vehicle for analyzing whether 
religious questioning violates the Establishment Clause. It sug-
gests that courts should instead apply a hybrid version of the two 
tests, the Lemon-Larson test, which is tailored to the specific con-
cerns that religious-questioning cases raise. Part III.A introduces 
the mechanics of the hybrid test. Part III.B examines the sources 
available to courts when applying the test. Part III.C applies the 
Lemon-Larson test to Cherri, Isakhanova, and various other 
factual situations to demonstrate how it ought to be applied and 
how it helps work through the concerns triggered by religious-
questioning policies. Part III.D concludes with a summary of why 
the Lemon-Larson test is the proper test to apply to these novel 
Establishment Clause cases. 
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A. A Hybrid Approach: The Lemon-Larson Test 
The proposed Lemon-Larson test has three steps. Step One 
applies Larson strict scrutiny to the policy in question. Step Two 
applies the Lemon effects test. Step Three applies a balancing test 
if there are divergent Step One and Step Two outcomes. The 
Lemon-Larson test therefore replaces the first prong of Lemon, 
the purpose test, with the Larson strict scrutiny inquiry. It also 
employs a balancing test at Step Three, rather than necessarily 
invalidating any government policy that “fails to satisfy” any of 
the Lemon prongs.160 
A court evaluating a religious-questioning policy under 
Lemon-Larson will start by applying strict scrutiny to the policy. 
As in Larson, this requires that the court determine whether the 
policy furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and is “closely 
fitted to further that interest.”161 The court may find the policy 
invalid under Step One. In this case, the court does not need to 
continue the analysis because the policy is unconstitutional. 
If the policy passes Step One, meaning it passes strict scru-
tiny, the court will proceed to Step Two. Substantively, the Step 
Two analysis remains largely the same as the analysis already 
undertaken by courts under the Lemon effects test, including the 
incorporation of the “entanglement” inquiry.162 The court will con-
sider the effects of a government policy and look for policies that 
“communicat[e] a message” of disapproval toward a religion.163 
Failing at Step Two renders a policy presumptively invalid. 
Unlike in Lemon, however, a government policy does not 
necessarily fail under Lemon-Larson if it fails the effects test. 
Step Three is a balancing test that weighs the effects of a govern-
ment policy against the government interests underlying the pol-
icy. Step Three is triggered in cases in which Step One suggests a 
policy is valid and Step Two suggests that it is invalid. Although 
the presumption in favor of invalidity will mean that a failure at 
Step Two will often doom a policy, Step Three ensures that the 
effects test does not always prove outcome determinative. Instead, 
it allows for a persuasive analysis at Step One to influence the 
outcome even when Step Two would find a policy invalid. This 
requires a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis: “Every government 
 
 160 Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 583 (1987). 
 161 Larson, 456 US at 246–47. 
 162 See Part I.A.1. 
 163 Lynch, 465 US at 692 (O’Connor concurring). 
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practice must be judged in its unique circumstances.”164 The prac-
tical application of this step is explored in Part III.C. At a general 
level, a close finding at Step One will never outweigh a presump-
tive finding of invalidity at Step Two, even if the Step Two finding 
is also close. Similarly, a Step One analysis that suggests a policy 
indisputably passes strict scrutiny will not outweigh a Step Two 
finding that the policy just as indisputably violates the effects 
test. However, policies that are close calls at Step Two may nev-
ertheless survive if they pass Step One by a wide margin. 
To summarize, in order to pass the Lemon-Larson test, a 
religious-questioning policy must have a compelling governmen-
tal interest that is narrowly tailored and that policy must either 
(1) not have the effect of disapproving of (or endorsing) religion or 
(2) if it does have the effect of disapproving of a religion, overcome 
a presumption in favor of finding the policy unconstitutional. 
B. Sources to Help Courts Apply the Lemon-Larson Test 
Though existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence informs 
how courts ought to undertake Step Two, analogous areas of law 
in which courts have applied strict scrutiny to discrimination 
against protected classes can guide courts when performing the 
strict scrutiny test in Step One and the corresponding balancing 
test in Step Three. Courts have provided guidance on what count 
as compelling government interests. These include protecting 
national security and preventing crimes.165 Instructive cases also 
show that not every government activity that involves a protected 
class necessarily raises alarm.166 
Specific cases provide benchmarks that can guide courts’ 
Steps One and Three analyses. These cases show that even 
generally compelling interests—such as protecting national secu-
rity—will not justify a policy that appears to be driven by mere 
common sense, particularly when that common sense reeks of 
bias. Hassan v City of New York167 is a recent Third Circuit opin-
ion that denied the city’s motion to dismiss claims concerning the 
 
 164 Id at 694 (O’Connor concurring). 
 165 See Hassan v City of New York, 804 F3d 277, 306–07 (3d Cir 2015); Schall v 
Martin, 467 US 253, 264 (1984). 
 166 See, for example, Lewis v Ascension Parish School Board, 806 F3d 344, 357 (5th 
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broad surveillance by the New York Police Department (NYPD) of 
the New York City Muslim community following September 11.168 
The city argued that national security and public safety concerns 
justified the NYPD’s surveillance policy. The court, applying 
heightened scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, was not con-
vinced. The “gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of 
questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may 
employ to pursue a given purpose.”169 The court held that the city 
had to ground its “asserted justification” in “objective evidence,” 
not merely “appeals to ‘common sense’ which might be inflected 
by stereotypes”—and even then the policy had to “fit” better than 
any “alternative means.”170 
Another instructive case is the Second Circuit’s Tabbaa v 
Chertoff.171 This case complements Hassan by offering an example 
of a policy that passed strict scrutiny because it was properly 
tailored and there were no clear alternative means available to 
accomplish the government’s goals. The court found a stop-and-
search policy that affected certain Muslims at the border to be 
constitutional under strict scrutiny.172 The narrow tailoring of the 
policy was crucial to the court’s decision. The policy did not target 
all Muslims, but only participants of a conference on Islam. The 
CBP initiated its policy after receiving specific intelligence linking 
the conference to extremism.173 Finally, the searches were routine 
and did not include heightened or invasive searches.174 
Another related and instructive line of strict scrutiny juris-
prudence considers policies that discriminate based on race. 
While religion and race are governed by different constitutional 
clauses, they interact closely in the space of discrimination and 
profiling, making this analogy appropriate.175 One of the few times 
 
 168 Id at 306. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 171 509 F3d 89 (2d Cir 2007). 
 172 See id at 107. 
 173 See id at 106. 
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such a discriminatory policy is valid is when the government is 
facing a “social emergency”176 and if the chosen policy fits the 
“compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that 
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice 
or stereotype.”177 An informative case is United States v Montero-
Camargo,178 in which the Ninth Circuit found unconstitutional a 
policy whereby border agents, based only on the drivers’ Hispanic 
ethnicity, stopped drivers out of suspicion of their immigration 
status.179 Echoing the concerns that animate the Lemon test, the 
court stated that such a policy both had “little probative value” 
and “send[s] a clear message that those who are not white enjoy 
a lesser degree of constitutional protection—that they are in 
effect assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals 
second.”180 
As demonstrated in the following Section, the logic used in 
these and similar cases helps inform the application of the 
Lemon-Larson test. Taken together, the cases illustrate the high 
bar that government policies must clear when they single out a 
specific protected group. Significant government interests alone, 
as shown in Hassan, will not make a policy valid, nor will policies 
that allow room for stereotypes and prejudice to sneak in. Never-
theless, tailored policies that discriminate against a particular 
class but address specific, compelling government interests when 
no alternative is available can be constitutional, as demonstrated 
by the search policy in Tabbaa. 
C. Applying the Lemon-Larson Test 
To demonstrate the Lemon-Larson test’s applicability to 
religious-questioning policies, this Section applies it to various 
factual scenarios. In practice, this test respects both compelling 
governmental interests and deep wariness about any government 
entanglement with religion. This Section first applies the test to 
the policies at issue in Isakhanova and Cherri, both of which 
would be considered unconstitutional. It then explores similar 
 
Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimina-
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hypothetical religious-questioning scenarios to demonstrate the 
nuances of Lemon-Larson that would not be provided by either 
test alone.181 
1. Isakhanova fails the Lemon-Larson test at Step One. 
Had the district court applied the Lemon-Larson test to the 
religious-questioning policy in Isakhanova, the analysis would 
have been straightforward and the result predictable. There 
seems to be little question that the policy should be considered 
unconstitutional under Step One. Recall that the prison guards 
in Isakhanova paired religious questions (“Do you pray five times 
a day?”) with facially disparaging comments (“All Muslims are 
terrorists”). It would be difficult for the prison to argue that this 
policy was driven by a compelling government interest. As shown 
in cases like Hassan, broad claims about general governmental 
interests like “national security” without “objective evidence” do 
not pass muster as a compelling government interest.182 In 
Isakhanova, the government did not even present such a broad 
claim. It “offered no explanation” of how the religious questions 
related to the prison guard’s investigation of alleged tobacco 
smuggling.183 
Even if the defendants had raised some potentially compelling 
interest, such as the security of the prison, the religious question-
ing would still fail under Step One. Not only is this broad justifi-
cation not grounded in “objective evidence,” but the questions are 
not narrowly tailored to this end. The derogatory comments 
certainly added nothing to potential fact gathering by the prison 
guard, and strongly suggest that religiously motivated humilia-
tion or offense, rather than gathering evidence, was the purpose 
of the questioning. The Government’s best defense in Isakhanova 
would be to try to argue that the guard’s comments were one-off 
and not an official policy; if true, this might protect the govern-
ment from liability.184 
 
 181 These hypotheticals all concern American citizens, thereby avoiding the different 
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2. Cherri fails the Lemon-Larson test at Step Three. 
While the questioning in Cherri would also fail the Lemon-
Larson test, this analysis is much closer and the policy likely fails 
only once the effects test is balanced against the government’s in-
terest in Step Three. This is because the government’s interest—
protecting national security—was much more apparent in Cherri 
than in Isakhanova. As the court put it, the government’s interest 
in controlling who is allowed into the country is “at its zenith at 
the international border.”185 
The crux of Step One of the Lemon-Larson analysis for Cherri 
is determining whether the questioning was sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. The nature of the questioning appears to be much more 
similar to the invalid surveillance in Hassan (when an entire 
community was surveilled based on generalized concerns) than 
the valid stops in Tabbaa (when the Muslim plaintiffs were sub-
jected to standard searches based on specific intelligence about a 
conference they chose to attend).186 In Cherri, individuals passing 
through a border checkpoint were stopped for no reason other 
than their ethnicity and apparent religion and asked questions 
that are not part of a general security stop, including “How many 
times a day do you pray?” and “Which mosque do you go to?”187 
The plaintiffs also alleged that CBP agents at other ports of entry 
posed questions including “Are there any extremists or terrorists 
at the mosque?” and “Do you know Anwar al-Awlaki [a known 
terrorist]?”188 Asking such an array of questions to individuals 
who happen to be affiliated with a specific religion does not 
appear narrowly tailored or grounded in “objective evidence.”189 
Rather, this questioning seems to be grounded in “common sense” 
that is “inflected by stereotypes.”190 As such, it leaves open the 
“possibility” that the questioning is driven by “illegitimate . . . 
prejudice or stereotype.”191 As with the impermissible stops in 
Montero-Camargo, the Cherri questions suggest that, because of 
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their religion, these plaintiffs were “assumed to be potential crim-
inals first and individuals second.”192 
Still, it is likely that a court would find the Cherri questioning 
constitutional under the Step One strict scrutiny test. Courts are 
“sensitive” to the security needs of border agents.193 Border agents 
are generally allowed broad discretion to profile individuals as 
they work to protect national security.194 Given the deference 
shown to border agents, it is likely that, in practice, a court would 
not closely scrutinize the rationale of the government’s national 
security justification at the border.195 
But the analysis would not end there. The Cherri case would 
move to the effects test at Step Two. As discussed in Part I.A.1, 
the effects test asks what a well-informed reasonable observer 
would understand the effects of the government policy to be. 
Benchmarks for unconstitutional remarks come from Capistrano: 
the description of creationism as “religious, superstitious non-
sense” was invalid, but the Mark Twain “con man” quote was 
valid.196 The Cherri questions ought to be found to be invalid, just 
as the “superstitious” comment was. The offensiveness of the 
Cherri questions, however, is more implicit than in the explicitly 
offensive Capistrano comments. The border agents did not di-
rectly slander Islam. 
Instead, they used Islam as a proxy to ascertain whether the 
individual being questioned was a national security risk. A 
reasonable observer might see this as a justifiable motive. 
Regardless of whether the motive was proper, the questions still 
conflate the practice of Islam with terrorism. This communicates 
a message of disapproval toward Islam that a reasonable observer 
would find at least as offensive as referring to creationism as 
“superstitious nonsense,” even if the offense is not as immediately 
apparent. 
This reasonable observer can be pieced together using social 
science research, rather than conjecture, as appeared to happen in 
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the actual Cherri and Isakhanova cases. Significant research has 
shown that individuals and the government in post–September 11 
America have internalized the perceived connection between 
Islam and terrorism.197 This would be particularly true for the rea-
sonable observer in 2017. Such an individual would be generally 
familiar with the fact that the president of the United States had 
called during his candidacy for a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States” based on concerns about 
“horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and 
have no sense of reason or respect for human life”; had stated that 
“Islam hates us”; and had suggested that Christian refugees 
should be given priority over Muslim ones at America’s shores.198 
The well-informed reasonable observer in modern America under-
stands the perceived connection between Islam and terrorism. 
Questions centered on Islam, especially in the context of an 
interrogation by a government official tasked with protecting 
American security, express disapproval by sanctioning this nega-
tive stereotype of the religion. Furthermore, this was not a one-
off comment by a visiting minister, as in Town of Greece.199 This 
was a formal policy put into place by government officials who 
determined that the way to gauge whether an individual is a risk 
is to know the extent to which he follows Islam.200 Given the scope 
of the policy and the reasonable observer’s awareness of recent 
American history, the religious questioning would be understood 
to “denigrate” a religion by equating its followers with security 
threats.201 
Because the Cherri policy fails the Step Two effects test, it 
would be presumptively invalid. It fails to overcome that presump-
tion at Step Three. Here, the strongly negative effects balanced 
against the borderline validity under strict scrutiny would render 
the Cherri questioning unconstitutional. The Cherri policy barely 
 
 197 See Amjad Mahmood Khan, Religious Freedom as a National Security Imperative: 
A New Paradigm (Harvard National Security J, Mar 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
E36W-PFKP (discussing how current US government strategies “overemphasiz[e] a 
terrorism-focused analysis of Islam”). See also Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the 
Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11, 13 NY City L Rev 33, 
37–38 (2009). 
 198 See International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 857 F3d 554, 594 (listing 
times when President Trump “expressed anti-Muslim sentiment”); Burke, Trump Says US 
Will Prioritize Christian Refugees (cited in note 2). 
 199 See Town of Greece, 134 S Ct at 1824. 
 200 See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 924–25. 
 201 See Town of Greece, 134 S Ct at 1824. 
226 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:193 
 
passes strict scrutiny: it does because the government has a com-
pelling interest in protecting national security, with additional 
discretion at the border. The policy still suffers from a lack of a 
concrete connection between the questions asked and that inter-
est, and from a failure to narrowly tailor the questioning. Asserting 
the “gravity of [a] threat alone” does not justify an otherwise-
unjustifiable government policy.202 Compared with barely passing 
under strict scrutiny, the Cherri policy certainly fails Step Two; 
it expresses animus toward Islam by using Islamic observance as 
a factor indicating a national security threat. The policy therefore 
fails: the balancing test at Step Three presumptively finds a pol-
icy invalid if it fails Step Two. Because this policy barely passed 
Step One, it does not overcome that presumption. 
The Government would have a few potential defenses against 
finding the Cherri policy unconstitutional. For one, a court has to 
weigh the presumption of invalidity under Lemon-Larson against 
the deference afforded the government at the border, where its 
power is at its “zenith.” Given this deference, the Government 
could argue that a court should treat the Cherri policy just as the 
Second Circuit treated the search policy in Tabbaa.203 That court 
relied on the CBP’s “extensive expertise in securing the border” 
and deferred to the agency’s decision that the “routine procedures” 
were called for.204 These “routine procedures” included targeting 
attendees at an Islamic conference for searches, fingerprinting, 
questioning, and photographing.205 The Tabbaa plaintiffs (who 
did not raise Establishment Clause claims)206 were not questioned 
about their religious beliefs, but the Government could posit that 
the connection between their religion and the searches was just 
as clear as in Cherri. The searches in Tabbaa were potentially 
more intrusive, at least physically, than the questioning in 
Cherri. These facts weigh in favor of the same outcome in each 
case. Such arguments have some merit, but ultimately they fail. 
The Government in Tabbaa claimed that it had received specific 
intelligence about potential danger from attendees of the confer-
ence at issue,207 and the searches performed, while extensive, were 
tailored to determining whether the searched individuals posed a 
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threat. The questions asked of the Cherri plaintiffs did not fulfill 
the same purpose as running a fingerprint or searching a car for 
dangerous items. 
Finding the Cherri policy unconstitutional under Lemon-
Larson demonstrates that the test remains consistent with the 
theory underpinning Lemon. Lemon does not employ a balancing 
test or engage with strict scrutiny because it prohibits all exces-
sive government entanglement with religion. The Lemon-Larson 
test gives the government some breathing room for situations in 
which religion truly does implicate government interests. If the 
Larson step consistently outweighed the effects test, however, 
that would reduce the Lemon-Larson test to the Larson test. The 
Cherri policy signals clear, strong government disapproval of 
Islam, impermissible under Lemon. Its validity under Step One 
strict scrutiny is a close call. The fact that the policy may be ap-
propriate under Larson, therefore, is not enough to render it valid 
at Step Three. 
3. Other factual scenarios demonstrate the Lemon-Larson 
test’s fit for religious-questioning cases. 
The Lemon-Larson test can be applied to a broader set of 
potential fact patterns than those in Cherri and Isakhanova, both 
of which similarly concern a law enforcement official questioning 
individuals who have done nothing to raise suspicions about their 
Islamic beliefs. Hypothetical fact patterns (loosely based on true 
events) further demonstrate that Lemon-Larson is well suited to 
analyzing the unique concerns raised in religious-questioning 
cases. 
There are some fact patterns that can be decided easily under 
the Lemon-Larson test. These demonstrate that Lemon-Larson 
does not disrupt existing jurisprudence surrounding longstanding 
US practices; it creates a way to accommodate new ones. The cen-
sus, for instance, is still constitutional under both Step One and 
Step Two of Lemon-Larson (meaning no Step Three balancing is 
required). The government collects information on citizens’ self-
described religious identification through the American Religious 
Identification Survey (“ARIS”).208 The government interest here is 
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clear and unobjectionable (to gather demographic information)209 
and the question is tailored to the specific piece of information the 
government wants as closely as it could be. There is no reason to 
believe that a reasonable observer would understand a general 
question about religious affiliation to disapprove of, or endorse, 
religion. 
The questioning in Vernon210 would likewise still be constitu-
tional. Under Step One, the government’s purpose was clear 
(making sure an assistant police chief was not breaking the law)211 
and the investigation was narrowly tailored to precisely the be-
havior that had called into question Vernon’s ability to faithfully 
execute his job. Moving on to Step Two, a reasonable observer 
would understand that the questioning was driven by Vernon’s 
own conflation of his religious beliefs with his responsibilities as 
a police officer, and not by disapproval of his sect of Christianity. 
Hypothetical religious-questioning scenarios demonstrate 
the Lemon-Larson test would not allow law enforcement officers 
to invoke religion by alleging “compelling interests” that were 
clearly pretextual. An example of an obviously unconstitutional 
religious-questioning policy would be police wandering around 
Borough Park in New York City while investigating a child-abuse 
scandal involving the Hasidic Jewish community,212 stopping 
passersby who appear to be Hasidic Jews, and asking them “Why 
would you believe in such an outdated religion?” and “Why would 
you be a part of a religion that covers up child abuse?” The gov-
ernment might claim that, as in Vernon, the police are attempting 
to solve a crime. However, the insulting questions are ill fitted to 
finding the perpetrator of the crime. The individuals being ques-
tioned have demonstrated no connection between their poten-
tially criminal actions and their religion, and there is presumably 
no “objective evidence” to prove a connection between the interest 
and the questions. This policy would fail at Step One. 
The Lemon-Larson test allows for a nuanced, informative 
analysis in situations in which religious questions may actually 
uncover helpful information and the policy has a facially legiti-
mate, reasonable government purpose. One difficult and close, 
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but ultimately constitutional, fact pattern would be if the police 
gain intelligence that members of the Kingston Group, a radical 
religious sect holding fundamentalist Mormon beliefs in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, are engaging in polygamy and making forced 
marriage arrangements via letters.213 The government wants to 
figure out who is engaged in this scheme, but members of the 
Kingston Group wear “conventional clothing” with no obvious 
markers.214 With no other clues to go on other than the group’s 
stated religious beliefs, postal workers at area post offices are 
instructed to discreetly pull aside everyone who they believe to be 
Mormon and ask them questions including “Do you believe in 
polygamy?”; “Do you know anyone in the Kingston family?”; and 
“Why are you Mormon?” Starting at Step One, the government 
has a compelling interest in stopping crime. The questions are 
also more narrowly tailored than Hassan or Cherri. As in Tabbaa, 
the government is attempting to target members of a specific com-
munity engaged in a specific flagged activity (mailing letters). 
The activity is legal (as is attending an international conference), 
but the government has reason to believe it is being used to facil-
itate a crime. The similarities between this situation and Tabbaa 
suggest the policy passes strict scrutiny. 
Though it passes Step One, this policy fails Step Two. This 
failure turns on how much a hypothetical reasonable observer 
knows. The Kingston Group has no affiliation with the main-
stream Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS), which disavowed 
polygamy long ago.215 It is a small splinter group, and the ques-
tions are trying to target individuals affiliated with that group. 
For an individual well versed in this background, these questions 
would pass Step Two. They are not disapproving of the practices 
of Mormonism, but instead trying to weed out members of a group 
that is breaking the law. There is no research, however, on what 
proportion of the population has heard of the Kingston Group and 
its radical beliefs. For this reason, assume the reasonable ob-
server has not heard of this small group. A reasonable observer 
who has general knowledge about the history of polygamy, the 
Mormon Church, and American disapproval of polygamy—but 
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not about the splinter Kingston Group—might miss the nuance of 
the questioning. No matter the government’s actual motives, the 
focus on Mormons in attempting to investigate the forced-
marriage scheme could very well be seen as claiming that it is 
Mormons, rather than members of the Kingston Group, who 
engage in illegal, forced polygamy. This would treat Mormons as 
“second-class citizens” and disapprove of the religion.216 
Because it fails at Step Two, the policy moves on to—and 
passes—Step Three. While the policy clearly passes Step One 
strict scrutiny, it only narrowly fails Step Two. Its failure at 
Step Two is also mitigated by the fact that a reasonable observer 
in Salt Lake City, where the Kingston Group is based and where 
it presumably has increased notoriety, would more likely be 
familiar with the group and understand the true thrust of the 
questions than a random American. Overall, it is a relatively nar-
row policy, which attempts to implicate religion only insofar as it 
relates to solving a specific crime. Some questions, such as “Why 
are you Mormon?”, may not be tailored as narrowly as possible. It 
is unlikely this question will be answered with “To engage in 
forced polygamy!” It appears plausible, though, for the govern-
ment to argue that its questions are truly trying to root out fol-
lowers of the Kingston Group. Assuming the police have evidence 
of the criminal activities of the Kingston Group but no way to 
uncover its members other than through this type of individual 
interrogation, then these questions are plausibly among those 
most able to narrow the population down to members of the 
Kingston Group who may be engaged in the criminal enterprise. 
The policy is not perfect, but courts are deferential (within limits, 
as shown by Hassan) to stated government interests when they 
are supported with more than superficial evidence. 
A hypothetical, revised Cherri policy presents another 
challenging application of the Lemon-Larson test. Consider the 
following: The Cherri policy is found unconstitutional, and the 
government hopes to conform with the law by making the ques-
tions religiously neutral with a “Cherri-plus” policy. Border 
agents are now charged with asking questions including “Do you 
consider yourself religious?”; “How often do you attend a house of 
worship?”; and “Are there any religious zealots or extremists of 
which you are aware at your house of worship?” If the answers 
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suggest that the individual is devout and the border agent feels 
something is amiss, the agents have more particular questions to 
ask that are tailored to specific religious practices. Agents have 
discretion over which people to question, but have been directed 
that Arab Muslims and people with pro-life bumper stickers (who 
the officials see as representing a threat to people at clinics that 
offer abortions)217 should be of particular interest. With the 
Cherri-plus policy, the government has diluted its focus on Islam 
and attempted to use facially neutral questions that invoke reli-
gion but only appear to call the legitimacy of specific religious 
practices into question once the agent believes red flags are raised 
by the screening questions. 
Under Lemon-Larson, the Cherri-plus policy would still be 
unconstitutional. The core problem with this type of questioning, 
hard to overcome in any permutation of the policy, is that it 
equates an individual’s religion with a threat—without specific 
reason to do so. It invokes religion when the individual being 
questioned has not given the government a reason to think his 
religious beliefs pose a threat. Even though the new policy overtly 
takes the focus off of Islam, it impermissibly treats devotion to 
religion of any kind as an incriminating characteristic; this line of 
questioning is worse than what occurred in Cherri because it con-
tinues to treat Islam as a threat but sweeps more religions into 
the umbrella of beliefs that trigger the government’s scrutiny. 
Therefore, rather than becoming more acceptable by incorpo-
rating more religions, the Cherri-plus policy is actually more 
concerning under Lemon-Larson than Cherri was. There are two 
potential reasons for the expansion of the policy: the government 
thinks that devoted individuals of other creeds are also a threat 
or it is asking those questions to diffuse the focus on Islam. If the 
former, the policy is invalid at Step One. Under the logic of Larson 
and Hassan, the government cannot, for example, cite a “security” 
interest in questioning pro-life Christians without presenting an 
“actual concrete problem.”218 This policy sweeps an entire commu-
nity of innocent individuals into questioning that imprecisely 
probes a poorly defined threat. The questions are also poorly tai-
lored—most pro-life Christians pose no threat to abortion clinics, 
and the questions are too vague to efficiently identify those few 
who might. 
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On the other hand, if the government is merely asking these 
questions to make it appear that the focus is not on Islam, then 
the Cherri-plus policy also fails the Lemon-Larson test. Under 
Step One, rather than being narrowly tailored to an “actual con-
crete problem,” this policy would just obfuscate the true purpose 
of questioning Muslims. This purpose can be understood in classic 
Lemon terms—the stated purpose of a policy cannot be a pre-
textual “sham,” covering up the actual intent to disapprove of or 
endorse a religion.219 
If the Cherri-plus policy moved on to Step Two despite the lack 
of narrow tailoring, a court would consider the policy’s effects. The 
government in this hypothetical considers religion a key factor in 
determining whether an individual poses a threat. This certainly 
impermissibly “communicat[es] a message” of disapproval to reli-
gion.220 An altered Cherri-plus policy is unconstitutional under 
Lemon-Larson, whether the government genuinely crafted it to 
target several religions viewed by the government as risks or 
whether the government meant to obscure the true target of Islam. 
D. Why to Apply the Lemon-Larson Test 
This Comment proposes applying a novel test to religious-
questioning cases under the Establishment Clause because exist-
ing tests fail to adequately address the concerns raised in these 
cases. The application of Lemon-Larson to Cherri, Isakhanova, 
and the other scenarios described in Part III.C demonstrates how 
the Lemon-Larson test accommodates both the unique role of 
religion in American society (captured by the Lemon test) and the 
unique concerns raised when the government truly has a compel-
ling reason to become entangled in religion (captured by the 
Larson test). The test does so without requiring a wholesale 
invention of a new test that would disrupt Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 
The Court’s Establishment Clause tests are incapable of 
adequately analyzing religious questioning. One could argue the 
opposite, pointing to the use of these tests in analogous cases like 
Capistrano that consider disparaging remarks toward religion.221 
It is true that disparaging remarks are similar in form to religious 
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questioning. However, they do not implicate similarly forceful 
government interests, such as the national security interests 
raised by policies like the one in Cherri. For that reason, Lemon 
is inadequate to handle the asserted compelling interests in 
religious-questioning cases. Lemon invalidates policies that vio-
late any of its prongs. This provides no breathing room for the 
government when religion truly implicates compelling interests. 
Cases like Hassan and Tabbaa demonstrate that courts are 
generally willing to provide governments with this breathing 
room in other spaces. The facts in Cherri are a good example of 
this shortcoming. While Cherri is unconstitutional under Lemon-
Larson, the test compels a court to grapple with the national 
security interests claimed by the government even though the 
policy communicates a message of disapproval toward a religion. 
Lemon cannot accommodate a compelling government interest 
that entangles religion in the same way. On the other hand, 
Larson alone cannot address these concerns. The Larson test does 
not incorporate concerns about religious liberty in the same way 
as the other Establishment Clause tests—a possible reason for its 
rare invocation by the courts. Larson suffers from the same short-
comings as the strict scrutiny tests applied in the Free Exercise 
Clause and RFRA contexts.222 In addition, the Court has applied 
strict scrutiny only to those Establishment Clause cases that 
concern policies that “patently” discriminate among religions.223 
Although religious questioning may implicate discrimination 
among religions, it does not necessarily do so. The Larson test, as 
a stand-alone test, should not be applied to these policies: the 
Court created it to apply to a specific subset of cases and did not 
tailor it to assess the validity of religious policies more broadly. 
The Lemon-Larson test succeeds in analyzing religious-
questioning policies when either test on its own would come up 
short. The applications of the Lemon-Larson test to the fact 
patterns from Part III.C demonstrate how the Lemon-Larson test 
shores up Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Utah post 
office example demonstrates the way the Lemon-Larson test can 
offer greater flexibility for government policies that become 
entangled with religion if the entanglement is for demonstrably 
compelling reasons. Yet the Cherri and the Cherri-plus examples 
show that flexibility does not come at the expense of longstanding 
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Establishment Clause values embedded in Lemon. The Larson 
test would render Cherri and parts of the Cherri-plus policy 
constitutional, but the Lemon-Larson test invalidates them. In 
this way, the Lemon-Larson test sets a higher bar for government 
policies that implicate religion than strict scrutiny, remaining 
faithful to historic Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
In essence, the two tests complement each other. Under 
Lemon, courts invalidate a policy if it does not have a secular 
purpose or if it has the effect of endorsing or disapproving of a 
religion.224 The compelling-interest balancing that is at the core of 
Larson strict scrutiny225 addresses Lemon’s primary shortcoming 
by allowing the government to adopt religious-questioning poli-
cies when truly called for. It provides courts with more flexibility 
without sacrificing the rigorous analysis required whenever a 
government policy implicates religion. At the same time, the 
Lemon-Larson test does not abandon Lemon’s values; it just uses 
Larson to tailor the inquiry. Step Two ensures that religious 
questioning is not merely subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis. 
Courts will still presume it is invalid if it fails the effects test in 
Step Two. This enhanced analysis successfully addresses the 
shortcomings from which either test applied alone suffers, mak-
ing it the proper test to apply to religious questioning. 
Adopting the Lemon-Larson test is also preferable to creating 
an entirely new test for religious-questioning policies. There are 
benefits to this latter option. An entirely new test could be 
completely tailored to religious questioning, free of the baggage of 
previous analyses and tangled jurisprudence. There are several 
reasons not to take this step. The primary one is that religious 
questioning, while unique, is still analogous to other Establishment 
Clause cases. The Lemon-Larson test can benefit from related, 
existing case law rather than require an entirely new set of 
decisions to flesh out its proper application. 
Furthermore, Lemon-Larson will likely be less controversial 
to adopt than a wholly new test. Courts already frequently use 
multiple Establishment Clause tests in their opinions.226 The 
Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe227 may not 
have explicitly adopted a new Establishment Clause test when it 
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considered student-led prayers before football games,228 but it was 
willing to tweak its existing tests to work with the facts at hand. 
The opinion mentions Lemon only in its final paragraphs.229 The 
core of the discussion centers on related concerns, including en-
dorsement, the coercion inherent in school–student relationships, 
and the difference between private and government speech, but 
does not confront these issues explicitly using the Lemon steps.230 
The Court appeared to think that this type of discussion was more 
helpful in determining the validity of the policy considered in 
Santa Fe Independent School District than a Lemon approach, 
which silos each step. Van Orden is another example of the Court 
adapting its existing analyses when considering new manifesta-
tions of Establishment Clause cases.231 It took a more dramatic 
approach than Santa Fe Independent School District; the Court 
thought Lemon itself did not need to be applied because of the 
different concerns triggered by the historical dimensions of the 
statue.232 The Lemon principles still motivated the decision, though. 
The Court’s ultimate decision focused on the “dual significance”—
both religious and governmental—of the statue (reflecting the 
search for a secular purpose) and that the plaintiff “walked by the 
monument for a number of years” before finding it upsetting (sug-
gesting the monument did not have an invalid effect on him).233 
Another case in which the Court stepped outside of the traditional 
Establishment Clause framework is Zelman v Simmons-Harris.234 
The Court did not think the Lemon test necessary in its discussion 
of whether the school voucher program at issue violated the 
Establishment Clause.235 It found more helpful a close analysis of 
the difference between government programs that directly provide 
aid to religious schools and those that offer “true private choice.”236 
Its analysis did remain motivated by the Lemon principles.237 Both 
Lemon and Larson are already Supreme Court–promulgated 
Establishment Clause tests. This Comment merely proposes 
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adapting them to a new manifestation of Establishment Clause 
question. As with statues of historical significance and programs 
promoting school choice, religious-questioning policies raise unique 
concerns that merit unique attention within Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. 
Finally, Larson fits naturally into the Lemon framework. 
Lemon’s first prong already looks at the purpose behind a govern-
ment policy. Larson is also interested in the purposes of a policy. 
As compared to Lemon, which automatically invalidates a policy 
once it becomes overly entangled with religion, strict scrutiny 
allows for a more nuanced look at the narrowness and legitimacy 
of that purpose. The strict scrutiny framework provides the addi-
tional tools to assess the constitutionality of government purposes 
that necessarily implicate religion. It does so without requiring 
courts to significantly change the way that they approach 
Establishment Clause questions. The Lemon-Larson test will not 
clash with existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence; it seeks 
to take advantage of the way that Larson complements the Lemon 
test’s ability to navigate the role of religion in American society 
by offering a preexisting framework through which to measure 
the importance of a governmental interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Religious questioning by government officials implicates, but 
has yet to be fully analyzed under, the Establishment Clause. 
President Trump’s recent emphasis on refugees’ religions shows 
the need to understand how this type of policy—which invokes 
religion but in meaningfully different ways than traditional 
Establishment Clause cases—should be treated under the 
Establishment Clause. This Comment addresses that gap in the 
literature. Traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
created to accommodate the unique relationship between the 
American government and religion, is best applied to this type of 
case through a modified analysis, the Lemon-Larson test. This 
test pairs the traditional Establishment Clause inquiry with a 
strict scrutiny analysis that allows for some government entan-
glement with religion when that entanglement is truly driven by 
compelling government interests. This hybrid test would conclude 
that most types of religious questioning, including the policies in 
Cherri and Isakhanova, violate the Establishment Clause. At the 
same time, it affords the government breathing room to implicate 
religion when truly called for. By tailoring existing Establishment 
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Clause analyses to the concerns raised by religious-questioning 
policies, the Lemon-Larson test allows for a thorough Establishment 
Clause analysis of a new form of government entanglement with 
religion. 
